Tillögur í öryggisátt Síða 5

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Boeing plans to release Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-SB-27A0154 on June 25 2016. In addition the FAA has issued Safety Recommendation 15.115, a Boeing 757 airplane level safety issue, mandating evaluation of the spoiler actuator's blocking and thermal relief valve housing failure to determine appropriate corrective action.

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The FAA has issued Safety Recommendation 15.116, gathering and reviewing compliance data, including hazard assessments, for each type of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 25 airplane operating under part 121. The FAA will be addressing Safety Recommendation 15.116 for U.S.-manufactured aircraft.

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The FAA has issued Safety Recommendation 15.115, a Boeing 757 airplane level safety issue, mandating evaluation of the spoiler actuator's blocking and thermal relief valve housing failure to determine appropriate corrective action.

Update 31.01.2017:

The FAA has reviewed and determined that the latent failure of the spoiler power control unit Blocking and Thermal Relief Valve (BTRV) housing does manifest itself when the hydraulic system it is attached to fails. The failure causes an uncommanded extension of the spoiler panel, known as spoiler panel float. The result of multiple spoiler panel floating can lead to the loss of the airplane. The FAA's Aircraft Certification Service has determined this is a safety issue and the FAA is in the process of publishing an airworthiness directive to address it.

Updated 6.10.2017:

The FAA has issued Airworthiness Directive 2017-04-07, mandating that within 51 months after January 23 2017, for all Boeing 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, and -300 series airplanes, certificated in any category, each spoiler power control unit (PCU) must be replaced with a new or changed PCU at spoiler positions 2, 3, and 4 on the left wing, and spoiler positions 9, 10, and 11 on the right wing, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0154, dated July 22, 2016. This concludes the above safety recommendation issued by the Icelandic Transportation Safety Board on August 13th, 2015.

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The FAA has issued Safety Recommendation 15.116, gathering and reviewing compliance data, including hazard assessments, for each type of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 25 airplane operating under part 121. The FAA will be addressing Safety Recommendation 15.116 for U.S.-manufactured aircraft. Furthermore, the FAA recommended to the ITSB to provide a similar recommendation to foreign aviation authorities for each State of design. The board of ITSB approved on a board meeting held on January 15th, 2016, to contact other states of designs of aircraft of similar spoiler design and extend the recommendation as needed.

Update: 31.01.2017:

The FAA has reviewed the design, manufacturing, and service information and determined the Boeing Model 757 failed BTRV housing was under-designed in that it had insufficient fatigue life. The reason for this was found to be a design error that led to a premature failure. The valve itself was designed by a third party, Moog, which reported that the valve is used only on the Boeing Model 757 series airplanes. Therefore this under-designed part is not on any other transport airplanes. Additionally, a quary of the FAA Service Difficulty Report (SDR) database did not reveal any other spoiler issue associated with the blocking/thermal relief valves in the past fifteen years on any transport airplanes. The FAA considers its action to Safety Recommendation 15.116 completed.

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Precision Conversions has modified the structural design of the main cargo door to support the intended 45 knots maximum wind operation limit in compliance with FAA FAR and EASA CS, subchapters 25.301(a) and 25.303.

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The STC holder addressed through service bulletin (SB) PC-757-52-0018 a redesign of the cargo door, replacing the aluminum rods of the door with steel rods.

In addition, for both configurations, pre and post SB PC-757-52-0018, the following wind/gust limitations have been established and incorporated in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual and Operations Manual supplements:

- 45 knots up to the door canopy position, 0 (zero) knots beyond the door canopy position, for configuration pre SB PC-757-52-0018 (aluminum rods).

- 45 knots up to the door canopy position, 25 knots beyond the door canopy position, for configuration post SB PC-757-52-0018 (steel rods).

These design changes and wind/gust limitations were mandated by the FAA AD 2016-04-24, which has been adopted by EASA.

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FAA Safety Recommendation 14.055 was assigned to the FAA's Aircraft Certification Service, Transport Airplane Directorate on April 15, 2014, requiring Precision Conversions to modify the structural design of the main cargo door to support the intended 45 knots maximum wind operation limit in compliance with FAA FAR and EASA CS, subchapters 25.301(a) and 25.303.

The STC holder addressed through service bulletin (SB) PC-757-52-0018 a redesign of the cargo door, replacing the aluminum rods of the door with steel rods.

In addition, for both configurations, pre and post SB PC-757-52-0018, the following wind/gust limitations have been established and incorporated in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual and Operations Manual supplements:

- 45 knots up to the door canopy position, 0 (zero) knots beyond the door canopy position, for configuration pre SB PC-757-52-0018 (aluminum rods).

- 45 knots up to the door canopy position, 25 knots beyond the door canopy position, for configuration post SB PC-757-52-0018 (steel rods).

These design changes and wind/gust limitations were mandated by the FAA AD 2016-04-24.

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Norðurflug hefur innleitt tillöguna á eftirfarandi hátt:

• Hluti í handbók 8.1.2.2
• Hluti af OPC formi
• Hluti af þjálfun fyrir þyrlu skíðun þar sem einkum reynir á þetta og í kennsluefni er ítarlega farið yfir „whiteout“
• Hluti af áhættumati sem gert er vegna nýrrar reglugerðar Ferðamálastofu

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Svar Samgöngustofu:

Vísað er til lokaskýrslu RNSA um flugslys TF-ABB við Þingvallavatn dags. 2. maí 2024 þar sem RNSA ”beinir því til Samgöngustofu að innleiða ADS-B senda í öll mönnuð loftför sem fljúga í íslensku loftrými”. Samgöngustofa telur að slík krafa væri íþyngjandi gangvart umráðendum loftfara í einkaflugi þar sem töluverður kostnaður felst í ísetningu og kaupum á slíkum búnaði. Slíkar kröfur eru ekki gerðar á meginlandi Evrópu né í Bandaríkjunum. Samgöngustofa veit til þess að nokkur loftför í einkaflugi eru búin slíkum búnaði en oft og tíðum er búnaðurinn óvottaður og sendir frá sér merki með ófullnægjandi gæðum og því ekki nothæfur fyrir Isavia ANS. Rétt er að taka fram að mikil þróun er á þessu sviði og Samgöngustofa mun fylgjast með framgangi þessara mála og hafa í huga komi til þess að farið verði að innleiða ADS-B sem lágmarksbúnað í Evrópu. Samgöngustofa mun því ekki gera kröfu um ísetningu ADS-B búnaðar í mönnuð loftför sem fljúga í íslensku loftrými að svo stöddu.

Niðurstaða RNSA:

Í samræmi við 35. grein laga 18/2013, þá hefur RNSA yfirfarið viðbrögð Samgöngustofu við tillögu 22-010F002-T1. RNSA telur viðbrögð SGS ekki fullnægjandi og hvetur nefndin til þess að leiðir verði skoðaðar til þess að draga úr íþyngjandi áhrifum innleiðingar og setji markmið um innleiðingu á ADS-B sendum í öll mönnuð loftför sem fljúga í íslensku loftrými. Mun tillagan því áfram standa opin hjá RNSA.