Tillögur í öryggisátt Síða 8

Afgreiðsla

Samgöngustofa setti af stað verkefni um endurskipulagningu svæða og sjónflugsumferðar fyrir austan BIRK. Reglur um breytta tilhögun sjónflugs í Austursvæði og austur af BIRK tóku gildi 1. júní 2016. Hin breytta tilhögun er byggð á hættugreiningu og áhættumati sem unnið var af Isavia að beiðni SGS. Flugumferðarstjórar sem og notendur loftrýmis (m.a. einkaflugmenn, prófdómarar, þyrluflugmenn) tóku þátt í þeirri vinnu og SGS stýrði síðan úrvinnslu lokatillagna, sem aftur voru rýndar af SGS og tryggði SGS að sömu aðilar kæmu ekki að úrvinnslu tillagna og rýni.

Eftirfarandi breytingar má finna í AIP, sjá hér.

Afgreiðsla

The FAA has issued Safety Recommendation 15.116, gathering and reviewing compliance data, including hazard assessments, for each type of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 25 airplane operating under part 121. The FAA will be addressing Safety Recommendation 15.116 for U.S.-manufactured aircraft. Furthermore, the FAA recommended to the ITSB to provide a similar recommendation to foreign aviation authorities for each State of design. The board of ITSB approved on a board meeting held on January 15th, 2016, to contact other states of designs of aircraft of similar spoiler design and extend the recommendation as needed.

Update: 31.01.2017:

The FAA has reviewed the design, manufacturing, and service information and determined the Boeing Model 757 failed BTRV housing was under-designed in that it had insufficient fatigue life. The reason for this was found to be a design error that led to a premature failure. The valve itself was designed by a third party, Moog, which reported that the valve is used only on the Boeing Model 757 series airplanes. Therefore this under-designed part is not on any other transport airplanes. Additionally, a quary of the FAA Service Difficulty Report (SDR) database did not reveal any other spoiler issue associated with the blocking/thermal relief valves in the past fifteen years on any transport airplanes. The FAA considers its action to Safety Recommendation 15.116 completed.

Afgreiðsla

FAA Safety Recommendation 14.055 was assigned to the FAA's Aircraft Certification Service, Transport Airplane Directorate on April 15, 2014, requiring Precision Conversions to modify the structural design of the main cargo door to support the intended 45 knots maximum wind operation limit in compliance with FAA FAR and EASA CS, subchapters 25.301(a) and 25.303.

The STC holder addressed through service bulletin (SB) PC-757-52-0018 a redesign of the cargo door, replacing the aluminum rods of the door with steel rods.

In addition, for both configurations, pre and post SB PC-757-52-0018, the following wind/gust limitations have been established and incorporated in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual and Operations Manual supplements:

- 45 knots up to the door canopy position, 0 (zero) knots beyond the door canopy position, for configuration pre SB PC-757-52-0018 (aluminum rods).

- 45 knots up to the door canopy position, 25 knots beyond the door canopy position, for configuration post SB PC-757-52-0018 (steel rods).

These design changes and wind/gust limitations were mandated by the FAA AD 2016-04-24.

Afgreiðsla

The FAA has issued Safety Recommendation 15.115, a Boeing 757 airplane level safety issue, mandating evaluation of the spoiler actuator's blocking and thermal relief valve housing failure to determine appropriate corrective action.

Update 31.01.2017:

The FAA has reviewed and determined that the latent failure of the spoiler power control unit Blocking and Thermal Relief Valve (BTRV) housing does manifest itself when the hydraulic system it is attached to fails. The failure causes an uncommanded extension of the spoiler panel, known as spoiler panel float. The result of multiple spoiler panel floating can lead to the loss of the airplane. The FAA's Aircraft Certification Service has determined this is a safety issue and the FAA is in the process of publishing an airworthiness directive to address it.

Updated 6.10.2017:

The FAA has issued Airworthiness Directive 2017-04-07, mandating that within 51 months after January 23 2017, for all Boeing 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, and -300 series airplanes, certificated in any category, each spoiler power control unit (PCU) must be replaced with a new or changed PCU at spoiler positions 2, 3, and 4 on the left wing, and spoiler positions 9, 10, and 11 on the right wing, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0154, dated July 22, 2016. This concludes the above safety recommendation issued by the Icelandic Transportation Safety Board on August 13th, 2015.

Afgreiðsla

lsavia lnnanlandsflugvellir taka ábendinguna til greina og að hún varði alla þrjá alþjóðaflugvellina sem félagið rekur. Allar upplýsingar um veður og ástand brauta (SNOWTAM) á BIRK, BIAR og BIEG hafa verið settar inn á sérstaka heimasíðu í nokkur ár (https://iws.isavia.is). Hver og einn flugvöllur hefur sína sérstöku undirsíðu.

Til að bregðast við athugasemd RNSA, verður bætt við flipa á yfirsíðunni sem heitir einfaldlega "SNOWTAM" þar sem yfirlit yfir stöðuna á alþjóðaflugvöllunum þremur kemur skýrt fram. Þessum upplýsingum verður bætt inn í næstu uppfærslu á Flugmálahandbók í kafla AD 2.11.7. Með því móti verða upplýsingar aðgengilegri, um brautarástand hverju sinni, fyrir starfsmenn flugstjórnarmiðstöðvar sem og notendur sem geta nálgast upplýsingarnar milliliðalaust. Við höfum jafnframt í samvinnu við lsavia ANS yfirfarið tengiliðalista á hverri starfsstöð fyrir sig, svo tryggt sé að flugstjórnarmiðstöð sé með nýjustu upplýsingar um starfsfólk. Jafnframt verður til gátlisti fyrir stjórnendur Flugstjórnarmiðstöðvar hjá lsavia ANS sem nýtist í tilfellum sem þessum.

Afgreiðsla

Samgöngustofa tók á tillögunni á eftirfarandi hátt:

Í lokaskýrslu um alvarlegt flugatvik N525FF á Reykjavíkurflugvelli 11. Janúar 2018 og gefin var út 7. Febrúar 2019 beinir RNSA til Samgöngustofu eftirfarandi tillögu í öryggisátt: 

„The ITSB recommends that ICETRA reviews Iceland AIP GEN 3.4.3.4 for BIRK and recommend that English is always used for ATC radio communications when at least one airplane on the ground and/or tower frequencies communicates in English.“

Samkvæmt AIP BIRK AD 2.17 þá er flugumferðarþjónusta innan flugstjórnarsviðs Reykjavíkurflugvallar veitt á bæði ensku og íslensku. Þetta þýðir að ekki er gerð krafa um enskuhæfni fyrir flugmenn sem fljúga innan flugstjórnarsviðsins enda geta þeir þegið flugstjórnarþjónustu á íslensku. Þá er ekki gerð krafa í íslenskum reglum að einkaflugmenn hafi hæfni til að tala ensku og með því að setja þá takmörkun að eingöngu skuli nota ensku ef eitt loftfar á tíðninni kýs að nota ensku, þá er verið að útiloka að hægt sé að veita flugumferðarþjónustu til þeirra sem ekki tala ensku.

Með vísan í ofangreint, þá er ekki hægt að tryggja að allir flugmenn geti talað ensku innan flugstjórnarsviðs Reykjavíkurflugvallar og telur Samgöngustofa því ekki mögulegt að bregðast við þessum tilmælum með að innleiða þessa kröfu. Samgöngustofa vill þó benda á sem mildun að samkvæmt upplýsingum frá Isavia, þá er viðhaft vinnulag nú þegar við ATS í BIRK CTR, að þegar enskumælandi flugmenn sem ekki tala íslensku eru á bylgjunni þá er leitast við að nota ensku eingöngu. Þetta er þó óskrifað verklag og lagt í hendur þeirra sem sinna flugumferðarþjónustu að meta aðstæður hverju sinni.

Afgreiðsla

During review of CAME procedures 2.28 and 2.25 with reference to training for Maintenance personnel (both Management and CRS) the following was identified; need to increase and make the training more clear with regards to critical task and independent inspection.

Air Iceland Connect has conducted the following to ensure that maintenance personnel (both management and CRS) are trained up to standard and adhere to procedure.

• Shift supervisors have been trained in handling of Critical tasks and production planning procedures.
• CAME 2.23 has been updated in rev. 50 to make sure that the performance of Independent Inspection is clear.

Furthermore, the training material has been reviewed and the following actions taken;

• Recurrent Training of Independent Inspection: Training Material has been updated to include why Regulation (EU 1321/2014) article 145.A.48 came into effect, including the accidents that led to it.
• Initial Training of Independent Inspection: Training Material has been updated to include recent incident findings related to Independent Inspection.

Currently, important information, best practices and recent incident findings, actions, root cause and mitigation implemented to prevent re-occurrence is distributed during Technical Safety Seminars held twice a year, that course will remain as practiced.

Afgreiðsla

Training for maintenance personnel has been reviewed. Initial training for employees will include overview of privileges as well as limitations set forth for Mechanics and Technicians in CAME and regulations.

Procedures in CAME have been reviewed with this in mind, and CAME 2.10 and roles and responsibilities in 1.4 have been updated in rev. 50 with a clear definition of the different limitations. The line between Mechanic and Technician has been made clear to make sure every employee knows their limitations.

List 1.6.0 Company Staff and Authorization list will be re-issued to include all maintenance personnel and certifying staff will be re-issued to include all employees with limitations and privileges presented to make it clearer. E.g. currently the list does not contain Non Part-66 Mechanics, Airworthiness Review Staff and office personnel. In next revision this will all be added to the same list to have a clear overview for all personnel.

Training Material will be distributed to all personnel when CAME revision 50 has been accepted by ICETRA, with a special focus on Mechanics and Technicians.

Afgreiðsla

Isavia hefur lokið heildarendurskoðun verklagsreglna flugumferðarstjóra varðandi heimildar til aksturs í brautarstöðu og heimildar til flugtaks þegar tvær flugbrautir sem skerast eru í notkun. 

Afgreiðsla

The following actions have been taken by AIC to clarify role and responsibility of Shift Supervisor with the aim to prevent similar occurrence. With update of the procedure, emphasis is placed on how to address unforeseen circumstances and take control of situations that may arise such as, sick leave, AOG etc.

CAME 1.4.8.2 has been updated in CAME rev. 50, to include the following regarding Shift Supervisor role and responsibility:

He is responsible for production and the safety of his assigned shift and personnel and ensure that sufficient personnel is available to carry out required maintenance tasks.

The following will also be added for further clarification:

• Reschedule shift personnel in case of unforeseen circumstances e.g. AOG and sick leave, to ensure that sufficient authorised and qualified manpower is available to carry out scheduled maintenance.

All shift supervisors currently working for AIC have been briefed on this and are well aware of their role and responsibility with this in mind.